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Abstract 
The paper examines the exchange of goods or services between only two 
subjects. The analysis is aimed at examining in particular the first 
phases of the process which, through negotiation, leads to the 
identification of the price on which the agreement is made. The  focus is 
on how the final result depends on the initial perceptions that the subjects 
have about the importance / relevance of the motivations involved and the 
power relationships as perceived by each side. These variables affect the 
determination of the "reserve prices" and therefore the starting conditions 
of the negotiation.  Then we examine the exchanges, which are not 
necessarily monetized, and which generate a variation of unbalanced 
welfare situations, occuring where there is the presence of a strong subject 
who is set against a weak one.  
Foreword: 
 The short essay that follows does not claim to be a rigorous academic work. It questions concepts such 
as "power" and "welfare functions" behind which there is a vast literature in sociology, psychology and 
economics which is largely unexplored by the author.  
Nevertheless, in the hope of providing some meaningful suggestions, a formal elaboration of the 
mechanism that governs exchanges in simple situations that involve only two individuals is proposed 
below.  
Attention is focused on cases in which there is an "imbalance of power" between the contracting parties: 
there are many such cases, particularly in those situations where authority prevails, in its violent forms; 
blackmail and corruption. 
The aim is to arrive at determining objective economic parameters (such as the price at the end of a 
negotiation) taking into account subjective perceptions concerning especially the imbalances of power 
between the parties involved. 
Since exchange is the basic mechanism, present at all levels, which influences the way a society operates, 
it is hoped that this paper may contribute to the construction of models that might, for example, simulate 
the economic mechanisms of a society in which, for structural reasons or otherwise, power imbalances 
are widespread. 
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1) Starting points.
Below is an analysis, in a simplified and brief form, of the elements that come into play in a process
of exchange, of goods or services, between two subjects.
At the center of the examination we have, firstly, in terms of conceptual reference, the subjective 
welfare or utility function1 of those who are preparing to start an exchange. As a relational aspect, 
then, in the context of exchange, the "power" dimension will be introduced which, as we know 
intuitively, plays a decisive role in the agreements reached at the end of the process. 
That said, in a normal exchange not encumbered by particular imbalances, what activates the 
exchange process is, for each subject, the "motivation"2.   
In this context we define as "motivation" the difference between the increase in well-being 
connected to what each subject is preparing to receive and the loss connected to what he 
is about to yield: 
 M = ΔU 
Where ΔU is the balance, in terms of welfare, between the positive variation connected to the acquistion  
and the negative variation connected to the sale.      
This is not a balance made of easily quantifiable amounts and algebraic differences: the ΔU is rather 
manifested, in the case in which investigations were carried out in the field, in the subjective belief of 
earning enough or a lot, or a little, depending on the case, even before a negotiation starts. It is the 
element that pushes, in a more or less strong way, the activation of the exchange process. In principle, 
the process is triggered by the most motivated subject. 
 *************** 
As an example we can refer to a classic situation: that of a tourist at a stall in an Eastern market 
where price haggling is the rule.  
1
In this paper we do not refer to particular expressions of the utility function or even to subjective probabilities: 
we take into consideration very simple situations in which we make comparisons only in terms of convenience or 
perceived imbalances 
2
The term "motivation" is widely used in psychology and in particular in human resource management studies. In 
this short essay we give a definition characterized from a strictly economic viewpoint. Economics is based on the 
premise that individuals make the choices that are best choices for them. What is best depends on the resources 
available, on the constraints, on the incentives, but above all on their individual preferences,  the reasons behind 
which are not investigated. 
Regarding this, the analyses of T. Scitovsky (1976) on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations should be noted. 
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The seller sees that the attention of the tourist has settled on an object the price of which is not 
shown. To determine the " negotiation dance " as H. Raiffa3  calls it,  there are, at the start, the 
reservation prices of the two subjects, i.e. the maximum price that the tourist is willing to pay and 
the minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell. Each subject does not know the reservation 
price of the other, but both formulate a hypothesis about it and from that position, starts the 
negotiation that, step-by-step, leads to the agreement. 
At the beginning, therefore, both the tourist and the seller evaluate the possible ΔU that concerns 
them (profitability).  
If, for example, the tourist were a collector who recognized an object that is missing from his 
collection, he would be very motivated to purchase it and therefore his reservation price, which he 
carefully hides, would be quite high. If the seller for his part was in a difficult economic situation, he 
would also be very motivated to close the deal and therefore his reservation price could be quite 
low, close to the cost he incurred to obtain the item. 
In this case and in all those that follow, the hypothesis is made that, before focusing on the elements 
that come into play in the exchange, the two subjects have at the beginning a rough idea, supported 
by experience or interactions of various kinds with the external world, of the convenience to 
negotiate and the price that everyone is willing to accept. In the case that we are examining, the 
tourist (buyer) will have a motivation (MB= ∆UB) to which an initial reserve price will correspond 
(PRB) and similarly the seller will have his motivation (MS= ∆US) to which the initial reserve price 
will be linked (PRS).    
It is believed that, in the perceptions of the individual   contracting parties, even albeit vaguely, there 
are relationships between these variables (MB MS) that can concretely alter the starting reservation 
prices of each player, bringing them to different P*RT P*RS values that are affected by each person's 
assessment of the motivation of the other party. 
A possible relation, to support an analysis on the topic, could be (distinguishing the evaluations of the 
two subjects) the following: 
(𝑃𝑅𝐵
∗ = 𝑃𝑅𝐵 ∙
𝑴𝑩
𝑴𝑺
)   where all the elements are evaluated by the Tourist (buyer)    1) 
(𝑃𝑅𝑆
∗ = 𝑃𝑅𝑆 ∙
𝑴𝑩
𝑴𝑺
)   where all the elements are evaluated by the Seller  2) 
3 Raiffa, Howard, 2003 (Seventeenth printing). “The Art and Science of Negotiation”. The Belknap Press of Harward 
University Press, Cambrige, Massachussets and London, England. 44-48. 
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The two formulas represent pretty much what occurs in the initial moments of an exchange process: 
looking at the first, which expresses the tourist's perceptions, if he realizes that the seller is strongly 
motivated to sell (MS high), he will lower his reserve price: he will be willing to pay less as the other 
party will be oriented to lower his demands in order to reach an agreement. So the seller, if he 
percieves a strong motivation from the tourist, would raise his reserve price.  
If both perceived, even if in different ways, a sort of parity in the reasons for the exchange, the MB/ 
MS ratio would be irrelevant and would not change the initial assessments. If one were to evaluate 
it in an interview in the field, the MB/ MS ratio should be verified as a "perception of imbalance" 
between the two motivations, as it is experienced by each of them, and certainly not as a relationship 
between two single elements that are difficult to assess. 
2) The element of Power.
However, the heart of this analysis is based on the certainty that in a huge number of cases that arise 
in everyday experience it is not enough to introduce the imbalance in motivations. We must bring 
into play an element of extraordinary importance: the imbalance of power. 
However, to arrive at the imbalance of power, it is first of all necessary to give a definition of power, 
limited to the sphere of exchange, which makes it possible to identify the possible forms of imbalance. 
To stress that this is a complex operation we believe it is appropriate to recall a reflection by Steven 
Lukes4:  
“…In daily life and in scholarly works, we discuss its (power’s) location and its extent, who has more 
and who less, how to gain, resist, seize, harness, secure, tame, share, spread, distribute, equalize or 
maximize it, how to render it more effective and how to limit or avoid its effects. And yet, among those 
who have reflected on the matter, there is no agreement about to how to define it, how to conceive it, 
how to study it and, if it can be measured, how to measure it…”. 
So defining power is a gamble. In the following, however, we limit ourselves to proposing a definition 
that can be applied to a rather narrow field: that of the exchange between two people. 
Within these limits, therefore, we define the "power" of a subject, within an exchange, as his 
(potential) ability to produce a significant variation of well-being, in a positive or negative 
sense, for the subject with whom he interacts, relinquishing well-being in his turn to produce 
it5 
4 Lukes, Steven, 2005 (Second Edition). “Power: a Radical View”. Palgrave Macmillan Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 
RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010.  60-69 
5 The definition proposed is not far off that of Galbraith (1983,1986) who identified three “instruments” of power which he 
called, respectively, condign power (the power to inflict unpleasent or painful alternatives), compensatory power (the 
ability to reward) and conditional power (the ability to change beliefs through education and persuasion). This definition is 
quoted in chapter 6 of Adam Ozanne - Power and neoclassical economics: a return to political economy in the teaching of 
economics - University of Manchester UK. 2016. 
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Having adopted this definition, we call, in general terms, X and Y the two subjects involved, and 
correspondingly KX and KY the power of X on Y and of Y on X:      
 KX= ∆UYX - ∆UXX 
     KY= ∆UXY - ∆UYY 
Where ∆UXX   and ∆UYY is the own well-being cost, by X and Y, to create the change of well-being in Y 
by X (∆UYX) and in X by (∆UXY).  
According to this definition the stronger the   disproportion between the potential benefit or damage 
that a subject can provide to the other and the cost in terms of well-being that he has to bear, the 
higher his power is. 
If, however, in all this discourse, we believe that the perceptions must match formulas or, mental 
processes must match formulas, then therefore the matching takes on more complex forms. In the 
case of motivation it’s necessary for each person to evaluate the variation of his own well-being, but 
in the case of power the subtraction – (∆UYX - ∆UXX) or (∆UXY - ∆UYY) - requires the comparison of the 
variation of his own well being with the variation of the well-being of the other person as he 
imagines it. 
We must hypothesize that this operation is actually carried out, in real situations, through 
evaluations, by both subjects. 
To back this up, we can provide some examples of how power is perceived in the ordinary sense: 
someone who, with a single phone call, obtains a job for another person is considered to have strong 
power; a mafia boss who gives the nod so that the shopkeeper who does not pay the protection 
money has his shop burned down, is believed to have a strong power. In both cases, a small effort on 
the part of those in power corresponds to a great benefit or a great damage to the subject to whom 
the "powerful person" relates to. In some ways the welfare functions of two different subjects are 
compared. 
The MX and MY motivations are, as mentioned, wholly internal evaluation factors for the two 
subjects; KX and KY are linked to potential interactions between the well-being situations of the 
two subjects that can, like the motivations, have a strong impact on the results of an exchange. 
A relation is then proposed, between the elements at stake, which is an extension of the one 
previously formulated between a buyer and a seller: 
(𝑃𝑅𝐵
∗ = 𝑃𝑅𝐵 ∙
 𝑴𝑩
 𝑴𝑺
𝑲𝑺
 𝑲𝑩
)     all elements are evaluated by B (buyer)    3) 
(𝑃𝑅𝑆
∗ = 𝑃𝑅𝑆 ∙
𝑴𝑩
 𝑴𝑺
𝑲𝑺
 𝑲𝑩
)     all elements are evaluated by S (seller)            4)  
For the purposes of a field survey, the MB /MS and KS /KB ratios must both correspond to the imbalances 
perceived by each subject: imbalances in motivation and power, imbalances that actually increase or 
decrease reservation prices. Beyond the formal representation adopted, there is no doubt that, as a 
result of the mental calculation that each person implements in unknown ways, the original reservation 
prices are eventually changed. 
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 ********** 
In the following, we consider situations that seem to be market –based, but which are not so in reality, 
as one of the the two subjects involved has no alternatives. 
Let us consider some cases in which the imbalances of motivation and power are clearly present, in the 
sense defined in the formulas 3) e 4). 
A type of relationship is that established, for example, between a gang master and a laborer to work 
in the fields. We will call the gang master “B” and the laborer, “S”. 
- The reservation price of the gang master 𝑃𝑅B (hourly) is, at the beginning, roughly, close to the
average current price for that type of work6. The gang master may not be strongly motivated to
recruit the laborer if he has many others available: his 𝑴𝑩 (buyer) would be low in this case. If
from various indications he understands that the laborer (seller) is in serious difficulty due to
problems of how to survive (𝑴𝑺  high) he would take it into account when making his offer.
Refusing to employ him, the gang master has the power to cause serious problems to the
laborer: therefore his 𝑲𝑩 is high while 𝑲𝑺 is obviously almost nil. At the limit, on the basis of
the formula, 𝑷𝑹𝑩
∗  could reach indecent values, in the order of a fraction of € or $ per hour, enough
for pure survival. It is an event that occurs with great frequency in similar situations.
The proposed formula, as a pure reference framework, seems to reflect quite well what happens in terms 
of perceiving the opportunities and the constraints on the part of both subjects. 
Let us now consider another case in which similar forms of imbalance occur in the evaluations that 
precede the path, long or short, towards agreement.  
This is the relationship established between an employer in a company and a worker over 50 years old, 
who has lost his job during the recent crisis. As usual we call “B” the employer (typically represented by 
the Human Resources manager in charge of hiring) and “S”, the person who is hoping to be hired. 
- The reservation price 𝑃𝑅𝐵  (or rather the monthly salary that the employer is able to offer) is, as
in the previous case, fairly well defined by the market, for the type of job that can be done by S
(seller). On the basis, however, of indications  gleaned  in the interview, the employer
understands that the motivation of S is very high due to family problems (𝑴𝑺 high). He is also
aware of having other applicants with equally valid CVs (𝑴𝑩 low) Therefore, he has the power
to choose someone else, causing serious damage to S in a period when there are few job offers:
i.e. 𝑲𝑩 is high and at the same time 𝑲𝑺 is low. The employer is inclined to lower his  𝑃𝑅𝐵
∗ .
- For his part, S is strongly motivated and defends his position as well as he can, but understands
the situation: although waiting for the moment of bargaining, if there is one, but already knowing
that he will have to accept what is offered, which is certainly below, and perhaps a lot below, the
average that was his reference point.
6
In reality, the definition of hourly pay regards the group of laborers that the gang master recruits and transports, 
but the elements that come into play in the gang master -laborer relationship are those described above making 
the hypothesis that the relationship involves an individual. 
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As a third case, we consider a fairly complex situation: an exchange relationship characterized by 
corruption. 
Consider the relationship established between a building contractor (A) with few scruples who needs a 
license in a hurry, and a council official of the relevant government office (B) who is in charge of the 
case. 
 
- Also in this case we can speak of reservation prices both for the entrepreneur and for the 
government official, considering the bribe prices paid in similar situations that depend on the 
gravity of the infringement and the value of the land to which the license refers. In this case, 
however, compared to the previous ones, the motivation of the entrepreneur to have the license 
and the official to have the bribe money do not present special imbalances. As for the possibility 
of A to damage B (KA) and B to damage A (KB) it is presumed not to present strong imbalances 
as both subjects are prosecutable for corruption. Neither of the two would report the other. The 
starting reservation price of both in this case would therefore not be affected. 
  
 
- If for some reason, however, there was a strong gap between the offer of the entrepreneur and 
the request of the official, if the entrepreneur was a powerful person with political support, 
almost immediately, in the face of veiled threats, the official would perceive the imbalance of 
power and would be forced to lower his demands. In this case the reservation prices would be 
affected, falling for both subjects, in probably different ways that leave some room for 
negotiation. 
 
By this example, you can refer to all those cases (and there are many) in which there is a controller who 
lets himself be bribed by a controlled: all cases in which a public official has the power to report an 
infringement of the rules or to grant a permit. A typical example is the financial police, but also the police 
where they are fighting drug dealers and the mafia. There is always a price that can be paid to remove 
an obstacle, and power imbalances affect the outcome of bargaining a lot. 
                                                                       
******** 
 
3)  The negotiation. 
 
Attention is now turned to the initial moments of a negotiation, those in which the adjustment of the  
reservation prices occurs.  
At this point, one begins what H. Raiffa calls, as we have already said, the negotiation dance: it is a 
complex process that involves various strategies that make use of hazards, fictions, concealments, 
emphases and so on. It develops in steps and is therefore difficult to represent. At the beginning each 
tries to understand the reservation price of the other and makes an offer that he would like to be close 
to it. 
Here, to argue our thesis, we extrapolate, from the complex treatment that is carried out in the text of 
Raiffa on the topics of negotiation, an affirmation 7:  
                                                             
7   Raiffa, Howard, 2003 (Seventeenth printing). “The Art and Science of Negotiation”. The Belknap Press of Harward 
University Press, Cambrige, Massachussets and London, England. 44-48. 
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"... when there are two bids on the table (S0 of the seller and B0 of the buyer), the best forecast on the 
final contract corresponds to the midpoint between them (S0 + B0) /2”.  
 
We now represent, in a simplified form, a process that takes place over time, hinting only in Figure 1 to 
the steps that would gradually represent the successive offers but then resorting, on the right of the 
figure, for a more fluid representation, to the progress of functions (fB; fS) which, starting from the values 
of the offers of the seller and the buyer, tend asymptotically to the reservation prices of each.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To represent this in a formal representation of a continuous type, we can adopt the equation shown 
below (hyperbolic tangents) which starting with an inclination linked to the reserve price of each party, 
they approach each other at a decreasing rate: where “t” tends to ∞ the value of the two functions tends 
respectively to the reservation prices PRB* and PRS*:  
 
         
   fB = BO + (PRB*- BO) (e2t-1/e2t+1)                                  fS = SO – (SO - PRS*) (e2t-1/e2t+1)  
 
The value of the two functions at the meeting point ( the theoretical value at which the 
negotiation concludes) is:   
 
𝑓(∙) = 𝐵0 +  
( 𝑃𝑅𝐵
∗ − 𝐵0) ∙ ( 𝑆0 −  𝐵0) 
( 𝑃𝑅𝐵
∗ −   𝑃𝑅𝑆
∗ ) + (𝑆0  −   𝐵0)
 
 
We see from the expression of 𝑓(∙)   in the case where each party were to make an estimate that 
corresponds exactly to the reserve price of the other (𝑆0 ≡  𝑃𝑅𝐵
∗  e 𝐵0 ≡ 𝑃𝑅𝑆
∗ ) the value would be   (S0 + 
B0) /2 in accordance with Raiffa's statement. 
 
 t     Fig. 1 
0 
RESERVATION PRICE OF THE BUYER (B) 
RESERVATION PRICE OF THE SELLER (S) 
BO 
SO 
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Since BO and SO are estimates of the reservation prices of the seller (PRS*) and the buyer (PRB*), it 
follows on the basis of relations 3 and 4, that the value with which the negotiation closes depends 
on the relationship between KB (buyer)  and KS (seller) to which the reservation prices are linked.  
The theoretical value therefore with which the negotiation concludes, depends on the perceived  
imbalance of the power. 
 
With the reflection proposed here, through very simple formalizations to which mental operations 
correspond in the two subjects which are not easy to identify, we reach the conclusions that have always 
been known to all: a very motivated subject, for example for survival problems, accepts without 
opposition the conditions that are imposed by a subject who has the power to get him out of a pityful 
situation. 
 
Relations 3 and 4 can be interesting for experimentation in the field, as they bring into play imbalances 
perceived by each subject that can be translated into coefficients greater than or less than one, which in 
terms of wishes, tricks, and fears or dreams of each person, can concretely and significantly alter the 
final result of an exchange with respect to what would happen in "normal" situations: those in which the 
relationships of motivation and power are comparable.  
                                                              ********* 
 
4)  The supply chains. 
 
This analysis can be extended to chains of exchanges such as those that occur in supply chains. Today 
these chains, thanks to the low transport costs for large quantities, can cross different continents, such 
as those that starting (backwards) from European countries end up in Vietnam or Korea or 
Bangladesh. 
They consist of a sequence of exchanges that take place between subjects with different powers: often 
the last ones in the chain are the weakest. Here, we see two extreme cases. 
 
The first case refers to Brazil:   
- If from the foundry products made in Brazil we go back to the coal used to produce them and to 
some of the areas where the coal is mined (for example the "batterias" of Mato grosso do Sul) 
we discover situations characterized by very strong imbalances of power between employers 
and workers. In those areas there are people called "gatos" who have the task of recruiting 
workers for the batterias in the favelas or in any case in the poor areas close to Mato grosso. 
- During the recruitment the gato promises well-paid work, food and the opportunity to visit 
families with a certain frequency. The gato enjoys great power as he promises good work and is 
fully aware of the high motivation of the people he is recruiting. Recruiting is easy. 
- Once the workers have been transported to the batterias, everything changes. The place is inside 
the forest and far from population centers, the workers must hand over their identity cards and 
their workcards, and they are already in debt for the costs of transport. Work in the furnaces is 
at the limit of human endurance. 
- Consequently: the power of the gato is very high, the power of the workers null, motivation of 
the workers very high as the alternative is death. The remuneration of workers is zero in most 
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of the batterias, as confirmed by formulas 3 and 4 above, where A is the Gato and B the individual 
worker. 
 
The second case refers to Pakistan:   
-  If we go back from the world of construction to the brick makers, for a part of the production 
we get to Pakistan where there are (as of a few years ago) about seven thousand kilns: huge 
constructions in which the bricks are fired. They are prepared by households starting from the 
earth which is transformed into mud with water and then shaped in the moulds. 
- The hierarchy of the kilns is made up of the "Munshi", the manager who responds directly to the 
owner and is surrounded by specialists (stackers, stokers, emptiers) and "Jamadar": the team 
leaders on whom the families who prepare the raw bricks depend. Often families are made up 
of former peasants left without land. They are mostly recruited by the Jamadar, who provide 
them with a roof and the essentials for living but leaving them in debt. Household income covers 
essential expenses: any unforeseen event (a funeral, drought, illness) involves indebtedness that 
must be repaid with days or months of labour. 
- The work is piecework: at least a thousand bricks must be produced per family per day. Drops 
in productivity are not tolerated: households that do not make enough are sold, with their debt, 
to furnaces located in remote areas where working conditions are even worse. They are 
transported by truck under the control of armed guards. 
- Young women and widows are subject to sexual harassment by bosses. 
 
Returning then to the reflections from which we started, the motivation of these workers (𝑴𝑺) is high 
because their survival is at stake. The power of the employer (𝑲𝑩)) is very high and that of the worker 
(𝑲𝑺) is null. It follows that the initial expectation of income of the worker, also linked in this case to the 
promises in the recruitment phase, is totally wiped out: the money that the workers receive is just 
enough for survival and the debt never goes down. 
 
At the root of these chains there is slavery. These are extreme cases: but it is often true that the latter 
have few alternatives and are forced to lower the price of their product to the extreme limit where the 
gain is cancelled.  
Then the fluctations of the market that occur in the upper part of the supply chain are reversed 
backwards due to the greater or lesser contractual power of the subjects that trade at the various stages. 
                                                                ********** 
 
 
 
 
5)   The exchange of goods or services. 
 
Until now we have considered the process that leads to the identification of the price that eventually the 
buyer (such as the employer) will pay to the seller (the worker). 
In the following we will consider those exchanges in which there is no money at stake and there is no 
negotiation, generally speaking: there is an agreement or a refusal. 
  
12 
 
 
Without the mediation of money we enter an area in which the focus of attention is the well-being of the 
subjects who are directly affected.  
And yet we cannot pass from the micro to the macro, aggregating the situations of well-being / malaise 
of individuals.  
A significant part of the economic analysis of the 20th century clashed with the difficulties that derive 
both from the adoption of an ordinal notion of well-being, that is, a ranking of welfare states in place of 
a hypothetical cardinal measurement of well-being itself, and a comparison between welfare systems of 
different individuals.  
We can simply  proceed comparing individuals on the basis of their income or we can make assessments 
about a community using a set of indicators.  
In this regard, the studies of Amantya Sen and her contribution to the construction of the Human 
Development Index (HDI) should be mentioned. Although representing an innovation compared to the 
simplest GDP per capita, the index shares with all the other indices the problems of choice of extremes, 
aggregation of simple indicators, choice of aggregation function and so on, and is, rather than being an 
indicator of well-being, more a indicator of the inequality between developing countries and developed 
countries. 
******** 
Returning to the micro area which this paper deals with, in order to support the reflection, a picture is 
presented in figure 2, in which the left part is dedicated to the subject A and the right part to B. 
On the left side we can distinguish: above the negative variation of utility (in red) that the subject A 
undergoes when he gives the good / service to B and, below, the utility variation, positive, which benefits 
A when he receives the good / service offered by B. In violet the initial level of well-being. 
On the right side the same variations appear in reverse order for B. 
They are symbolic representations of perceived values that allow each subject to evaluate the 
convenience to make the exchange.  
As shown in the figure, a vertical reading allows you to highlight the gap between what each one loses 
and what he gains: what we defined at the beginning as motivation. 
 
Horizontally, instead, we see the impact that the two objects, subject to exchange, symbolized in the 
central part of the figure, have on the wellbeing of the two subjects, the impact that expresses the power 
relations (difference between the variation of well-being that each subject causes in the other as a result 
of the sale of the asset it offers and the change in well-being, negative, which each one sustains, against 
the sale itself).  
Assuming that A is a strong subject and B is a weaker person, the sale of the asset offered by A (upper 
area of the figure) will determine a small variation in well-being in A and a large variation in well-being 
in B, while the sale of the asset on the part of B (lower area of the figure) could have a very high cost: to 
obtain A's well-being it may be that B has to greatly decrease his. 
The gray areas located on the left for A and on the right for B are spaces in which specific situations may 
be shown, where external elements influence, even greatly, the exchange without being connected to 
the goods at stake. These may be threats that involve potential changes in well-being or external 
context elements that can reinforce or weaken the power of A or B respectively. 
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As an example: if A threatens B, B has to accept the conditions of exchange set by A, which may already 
be negative for B, in order not to end up in an even more negative balance: the threat can be 
represented with a negative (potential) change in well-being in the gray area (side B). 
 
This category includes relations that are established in a hierarchy, for example within companies. The 
subordinate (B) may have little motivation to carry out what the superior (A) requires, but the 
relationship of power, to avoid future consequences, makes him do what is required of him. 
 
Another case: A might have the backing of an organization that supports him and that constitutes a 
potential threat to B. For his part, B can be protected by an environment made up of laws, cultures and 
institutions that shield him from the threats: all this can be translated case-by-case into a potential 
variation of well-being that, if activated, reinforces or weakens the power of each subject. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2          Level of well-being before the exchange of the good / service from each subject 
                      reduction of well-being for the giver and increase for the receiver  
                        Good / service offered from A to B 
                      Good / service offered from B to A 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
As a whole, the framework provides a symbolic representation of the circles that are activated in an 
exchange.  
 
The question that arises is: under which conditions is exchange accepted and with what power 
imbalance?  
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Reading the figure vertically, if MA and MB are both positive, then the exchange is accepted. But if a threat 
on B looms, the exchange can be accepted even if MB is negative. 
 
As already said, reading the figure horizontally, the upper part, which represents the sale of a good / 
service from A to B, allows the evaluation (in symbolic terms) of KA, based on the definition taken at the 
beginning, while similarly the lower part representing the sale of another good/service from B to A 
allows the evaluation of KB. If, however, in the gray areas, elements that reinforce or weaken the power 
of A or B appear, indirect power must be taken into consideration: a potential variation of well-being 
extraneous to the object of exchange: always of the type KA= ∆UBA -  ∆UAA, where however ∆UBA is the 
variation of well-being, for example associated with a threat, which is in fact foreign to the object of the 
exchange. This form of power alters the terms of the balance and makes the weak party consent to the 
exchange, because the refusal would lead to worse conditions. 
 
The KB/ KA ratio, again in theory, provides an imbalance indicator. As how the subjects then carry out, 
through their mental processes, these evaluations it is difficult to understand. Surely the "profitability" 
(motivation) is evaluated and in some way the power imbalance is always perceived, as a whole and 
not through its elements. 
                                                                 ***************  
 
We would like to make some further reflections with reference to the hypothesis that A is a strong 
subject and B is a weak subject. We will review two types of exchange, of the type we are considering, 
with the sole purpose of highlighting how power plays a role in determining various forms of imbalance 
including violence. 
First type: the strong subject A "promises" an asset and asks for a countervalue: the weaker B assesses 
whether it suits him, also trying to estimate the probability that the promise is maintained (if A does not 
keep his promise, B would not able to react because he has little power). 
 
- This type is present in cases where a "selection" is being made: selection of extras or secondary 
actors to make a film or a play, selection of models for fashion shows, selection of shop assistants 
for temporary contracts in shops or supermarkets, selection of exhibitors for trade fairs, 
selection of secretaries. The list could be long. In these cases the selector is the strong subject 
(strong in that situation) who can promise the candidate gets the job in return for sexual favours. 
- If the candidate is strongly motivated because he / she needs money, it may be that he / she 
considers it worth acquiescing: in terms of utility functions, the increase in well-being linked to 
the overcoming of primary needs in order to get by, at least for a while, may be higher than the 
discomfort associated with providing unwanted sexual favours. Therefore, if the initial situation 
is of great need, the motivation to accept the conditions set by the selector is likely to be high. 
This is frequently the case. 
 
Second type: the strong subject promises a benefit but at the same time threatens the weak subject with 
punitive actions if he does not accept the conditions imposed in exchange for the benefit. It is the case 
in which the weak subject has no alternatives and must submit to the will of the strong. It is a completely 
imbalanced exchange in which the motivation is provided by the strong subject, with an element 
unrelated to the exchange.  
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- The classic case is that of the "protection money" demanded of a shopkeeper by someone 
working for a mafia type organisation (the gangster is a strong subject because he has a mafia 
organization behind him). The shopkeeper does not ask for protection: he is offered it if he is 
willing to pay the protection money, but at the same time it is made clear that, if he does not 
accept the conditions, his shop might be in danger and so might his family too. The police in the 
area are corrupt and do not protect shopkeepers. 
- The power of the strong person is also high because he is protected from the outside. The 
motivation of the weak is high. It is impossible to reject the conditions offered without suffering 
very serious consequences. The environment behind the weak person does not protect him. He 
must therefore accept the conditions even if, with respect to the starting welfare situation, his 
motivation for the exchange is negative. This is a very widespread situation in all the areas 
controlled by the mafias. 
 
There are many cases that fall into these categories, but all fall into the "welfare / discomfort circle" that 
we have shown in Fig. 2. On a case-by-case basis, the context (the gray areas of the figure) may be 
different: 
 - If the strong is a bully, he will have people behind his group waiting to intervene should the boss call. 
 - If the strong is the general who attacks a young recruit, he will have a system ready to hide the facts.  
- If the strong is a pedophile priest, he will have behind him a powerful organisation that, at least in some 
cases, protects him.  
We prefer to consider separately the case of the weak, in the reflections that follow. 
                                                            ********* 
 6) Defence strategies:  
 
It should be noted that the weak (as well as the strong), in the context of these considerations is 
limited to the issue of exchanges, and not a particular category of people. The context and the object of 
exchanges are the elements that determine the level of weakness of a subject. 
 A powerful professional who finds himself with a broken-down car and a dead mobile phone at three 
o'clock at night in a suburban street of a big city is in a weak state: he will have to ask for help from the 
first person he meets, but at that hour he may fall foul of bad characters. He will have to face an exchange 
situation without defenses of any kind: it can end badly. The probability of meeting a "strong" person 
because he has a knife in his pocket (a strong person at that moment) is high: he could, without effort, 
take away everything, including the car, if he manages to get it to work. And the weak person, would not 
be able to resist. 
 
We try to say in the following, with some examples which will question the types of power, how a weak 
person can be defended by an environment and how he can defend himself with individual strategies. 
a)  How a weak person can be protected by a favourable context :  
 
- In general terms, it can be said that there are categories that are chronically weak when 
situations change: the poor and the disabled. An evolved civil society takes on the task of 
defending this type of weak person. It does so through the laws, the institutions responsible for 
respecting them, values and culture that spreads within the media and the schools. What results 
then is that acts of violence against defenseless people find an environment which is 
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immediately hostile, ready to react to protect them. This does not happen in authoritarian and 
corrupt regimes where the agents of the institutions make personal use of their power. 
 
- A weaker person can receive protection by belonging to a group that highlights its problems 
with the support of the media: in this case, for example, the unpaid workers who go on the roof 
of the warehouses or cranes, the demonstrations in the town squares or in front of the city halls 
of the earthquake victims to whom economic aid for reconstruction has not arrived, the 
torchlight processions against the local underworld that kills those who hinder its plans. 
  
b) How a weak person can defend himself on an individual basis:  
In  Steven Lukes’ already quoted text8 are some statements by James Scott9 including the following:" ... 
the powerless are often obliged to adopt a strategic pose in the presence of the powerful ".  
 
The prevailing strategic attitude is presented as that of those who, while having within themselves a 
feeling of anger and rebellion against injustice and the abuses that they are forced to suffer, must lie, 
smile even, and hold on.  
 
But there are also other ways to go in order to extend the definition of power to the ability to get help 
from one subject to another with whom one has a history of agreements, projects and 
collaborations or a story of friendship or emotional relationships. 
 
If we add these kinds of people to the weak and powerful we have talked about so far, then we 
can think of putting in place sequences of power relationships that can also give power to a weak 
person as an end result. 
 
We try to clarify this with two examples: the first from literature, the second a real case. 
 
In "The Purloined Letter" by Edgar Alan Poe we can see a defence strategy of a blackmailable 
character (the weak) which is rather anomalous and interesting: a perfidious and intelligent 
minister (the strong), who in meeting a person of rank, belonging to the royal family, manages 
to steal a letter, proof  of a secret love affair, with which he realises that he can blackmail him 
together with the lady involved. The victim of the theft knows who stole the letter and asks the 
Prefect of Police, his acquaintance and trusted friend, to recover it without publicizing the fact, 
promising him a very high reward. The Prefect uses all his skills to find the letter, by searching 
the minister’s house, in his absence, with all the most sophisticated means available to the police, 
but he cannot find it. Discouraged, the Prefect, offering a reward, asks for help from his friend 
Dupin, who knowing how cunning the minister is, goes to see him and discovers that the letter 
is actually in plain sight on a card holder, but with the envelope upsided down, on which the seal 
of the minister appears on the outside instead of that of the royal family which remains on the 
inside. Using a trick, he removes it and replaces it with a similar one, but with a message inside 
addressed to the minister who he hates, for having commited wrongs in the past. The minister 
does not know it but his power to blackmail has vanished and the lady involved in the affair is 
safe. The sequence is: victim-Prefect, where there is an economic power together with a 
relationship of trust; Prefect-Dupin where there is the economic power, but above all Dupin's 
                                                             
8  Lukes, Steven, 2005 (Second Edition). “Power: a Radical View”. Palgrave Macmillan Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 
RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010.  124-130.  
9 Taken from Scott, J. C. (1990) “Domination and the Arts of Resistance”: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
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previous hatred towards the blackmailer and the honor of the lady. Dupin solves the case not 
with police methods, like the Prefect, but by following the devious mechanisms of the 
blackmailer himself. 
 
- If an employee of a company that is not suffering financial problems is induced to resign because 
he is suddenly offered low-profile roles at a political moment when the union has no strength 
and the labor market does not offer opportunities that require the type of skills that that 
employee has, then the employee can only ask for a soft landing. But he has no contractual 
strength. He then resorts to a close relative who has a friend who is director of the staff of a large 
company, asking for help. The friend commits herself: she has daily business contact with a law 
firm that supports the company exactly in the making of layoffs, with which she does a lot of 
high-value business. In this case she asks, as a favor, to the lawyer with whom she has a close 
relationship, to play the opposite role with the company that is forcing out the person she is 
(indirectly) protecting. The lawyer willingly accepts and attends the redundancy negotiation 
without asking to be paid for his services. His law firm is authoritative and renowned for its 
achievements. In the negotiation, the parties agree for a more than satisfactory redundancy 
payout.  
These kinds of chains, which can be called Power Chains, are actually used with great frequency 
everywhere, even if often unconsciously. They are based on the fact that a person who is weak in one 
way may be strong in another and in other ways. 
 
This is a mechanism that requires imagination: the pathways, characterized by the fact that in each step 
the subject that intervenes is stronger than the next, are not immediately visible: we must build them 
abandoning the logic of common sense and the mental habits of our daily life. But it is an important tool 
that can make a weak person strong. 
 
To close with the defense strategies, it should be remembered that today network technologies can help 
us along unimaginable roads: if a child chased by a pedophile could secretly press a button that 
simultaneously alerted parents, siblings, if there are any, and the nearest police station (we have all the 
technology needed and it is even cheap) the pedophile could easily be stopped and arrested. Likewise, 
for those women who, when working in shifts, have to return to deserted streets late, it would be crucial 
to have a dedicated tool that would allow them to alert the nearest police station. It would be a much 
more effective defense system than having the patrols that police cars normally have at set times. 
   
7) From local to global:  
Taking into account what has been said so far, namely the importance of the power dimension in simple 
exchanges and supply chains, it would be very interesting to build two virtual models of societies, with 
the analytical tools we currently have, where: 
- In one, prevails an authoritarian and corrupt structure that determines at all levels the presence 
of imbalanced exchanges and supply chains in which at different stages, for the determination 
of prices, all the power of the strongest person is used. 
- In the second one, there are institutions and strong union organisations able, with the control of 
laws and contracts, to guarantee the balance in the various forms of exchange that take place at 
different levels of the social structure.  
It would be interesting with simulations to understand what effects the two different ways of operating 
the institutions have on the economic level: what effects they can have on the development potential of 
society and on the differences between wealth and poverty.  
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This is certainly a complex simulation, but would have, if possible, an extraordinary training potential 
in economics courses. I realize that in this thought there is a dreamlike component that has too much 
weight, but perhaps with the tools available today it is not entirely unfeasible. 
However, it is certain that the well-being and malaise of the various subjects operating in the two 
societies cannot be summed up: we know, however, that in the first model, well-being remains 
concentrated in the upper layers of society while the malaise is the dominant element in the lower layers 
of the population. We know that the gap between wealth and poverty is particularly strong in countries 
that adopt the authoritarian model.   
But we must add that, if we move away from the ideal model envisaged in the second type of society, in 
which all exchanges are brought back to balanced relations thanks to the intervention of institutions 
and, we look at what actually happens in Western democracies, then the imbalances return in the 
various exchanges at various levels and in the supply chains; imbalances that then lead to polarization 
between wealth and poverty. In any case we are convinced that not taking into account in the economic 
analysis10 the element of power, present at all levels of real society, does not lead anywhere if the 
characteristics of the world being examined are those highlighted in Fig. 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Corruption Perception Index 2017 -  Source: Tranparency International.  
                                                             
10 The following statement is significant in Galbraith (1973): “The decisive weakness in neoclassical economics…is not the 
error in the assumptions by which it elides the problem of power…Rather in eliding power – in making economics a non 
political subject – neoclassical theory, by the process, destroys its relation with the real world.  This statement is quoted in the 
introduction of the text of Adam Ozanne - Power and neoclassical economics: a return to political economy in the teaching of 
economics - University of Manchester UK. 2016. 
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 N. B.: The reflections summarized in this paper come from far away and are the result of a long 
study carried out in seminars held on the subject at the Department of Economics of the 
University of Trieste which involved professors of statistics, economics and psychology. I must 
confess that, as often happens, the ideas that have been developed in the various discussions, 
have suddenly found a place I believe coherent, presented here, to which indeed the texts quoted 
above have contributed significantly. 
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